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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~TEVEN L. WEST, 
Plaintiff a.tnd Respondent, 
-vs.-
MILES N. ANDERSON, HAL AN-
DERSON, CLYDE ANDERSON, 
MALCOLM N. McKINNON, doing 
business as AMERICAN FUEL COM-
pANY and CLYDE COX, 
Defendants atnd Appellants. 
Case No. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS 
MALCOLM N. McKINNON and CLYDE COX 
NATURE OF THE CAS.E 
On October 20, 1952 the defendant Hal Anderson 
drove a truck belonging to the defendants Miles N. An-
derson an'd Clyde Anderson, co-partners, to the premises 
of a mine owned by the defendant Malcolm N. McKinnon, 
doing business as American Fuel Company, for a load of 
coal. 
The coal was being loaded at the mine by the defend-
ant Clyde Cox, an employee of the defendant Malcolm N. 
McKinnon. Hal Anderson placed the truck in a position 
to be loaded with coal upon terrain which, it was agreed, 
sloped downward at a grade of approximately 6 percent. 
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Clyde Cox, who was loading the trucks by means of a 
scoopmobile, had placed 3 or 4 tons of coal in the truck 
when it started in motion and rolled downgrade and upon 
and against Steven L. West, who was reclining against 
a coal pile near where the truck was being loaded. Steven 
West was an independent trucker who had come to the 
mine for a load of coal. The defen'dants Miles N. Ander-
son, Ha:l Anderson and Clyde Anderson were represented 
by Attorney Dilworth Woolley. The defendants Malcolm 
N. McKinnon, doing business as American Fuel Com-
pany, and Clyde Cox were represented at the trial by Rex 
J. Hanson of the firm of Stewart, Cannon and Hanson. 
At the outset of the trial there was another defend-
ant, Eastern Utah Development Company, who plaintiff 
claimed was the employee of Miles N. Anderson and 
Clyde Anderson. The evidence showed that under the con-
tractual arrangement they were independent contractors. 
During the course of the triai the action was dismissed 
as to this defendant and it is not involved in this appeal. 
It was the contention of the plaintiff that Hal Ander-
son was an employee of Miles Anderson and Clyde An-
derson and that he negligently set the brakes of the truck 
he was driving, did not remain with the truck during the 
loading and that he negligently failed to place blocks 
under the wheels of the truck whiie it was being loaded. 
Plaintiff further contended that the defendant Hal An-
derson was negligent in that he left his truck parked 
with the front wheels turned in a down hill direction. As 
to the defendant Clyde Cox, the plaintiff contended that 
he negligently loaded the truck in such a manner as to 
cause the same to move from a stationary position; that 
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is, such negligence on his part consisted of either bump-
ing the truck with the scoopmobile or negligently drunp-
ing large loads of coal from a height of several feet into 
the bed of the truck; that he failed to ascertain that the 
truck was securely braked or blocked so that it would 
not roll forward while being loaded, and that he loaded 
the truck when it was unattended. 
It was claimed that the foregoing acts of negligence 
on the part of the defendants caused the truck to roll 
down hill and run on to the plaintiff, who was reclining 
on the ground in the vicinity of where the truck was being 
loaded. 
All of the defendants denied that they were negligent 
in the manner claimed and all of the defendants claimed 
that the plaintiff negligently caused or contributed to his 
own injuries by placing himself in a reclining position 
down hill and to the left of and in front of the truck which 
was being loaded and further by his inattention to the 
loading of said truck and failure to exercise due care for 
his own safety (R. 40-45). 
The case was tried to a jury and submitted to the 
jury on a special verdict (R. 129-134). By reason of the 
jury's answers to the questions propounded, the court 
entered a judgment against the defendants for $23,690. 
It is the contention of the defendants Clyde Cox and 
Malcolm N. McKinnon in this appeal that the verdict 
and the judgment should be set aside as to these defend-
ants for the reason that defendant Clyde Cox was not 
guilty of any negligence which was a proximate cause of 
the plaintiff's injury, the plaintiff himself was guilty of 
contributory negligence which was a proximate cause 
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of his own injury, and because the court in its instruc-
tions and special verdicts erroneously instructed the jury 
and submitted certain issues to the jury on which there 
was no evidence upon which a jury could have made a 
fin'ding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The place where this accident occurred is located 
in Huntington Canyon in Emery County, Utah (R. 24) 
and what is generally called a "wagon mine"; one not 
having any rai'lroad connection (R. 407). The area is 
generally illustrated by the photographs, Exhibits P-4, 
P-5, P-6, M-8 and M-9. The photos will show that it is a 
rather large, flat area between two canyon walls. The 
area is located near the bottom of the canyon at the en-
trance to the American F'uel Company property. There 
was a road extending through the property. On the south 
side of this road there was a pile of coal dust, referred 
to as "bug dust." On the north side of this road was a 
smaller area than that on which the pi'le of coal dust was 
located which dropped off into a stream running along-
side the canyon wall. The ground at that point sloped 
from the area in which the pile of coal was found, gen-
erally down hill toward the stream and down the canyon 
at a grade which was agreed to be 6 percent (R. 40). A 
scoopmobile operated by Clyde R. Cox (See Exhibits 
1, 2 and 3) was used to loa:d coal into the trucks. The 
drivers of the trucks decided among themselves whose 
turn it was to be loaded (R. 178), and drove the particu-
lar truck into the area adjacent to the coal pile when it 
was his turn (R. 178). The bucket on the scoopmobile 
slides up and down on the rack at the front of the vehicle 
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(Exhibits 1, 2 and 3). vVith the bucket in a lowered posi-
tion, the scoopmobile is driven into the pile of coal until 
the bucket is full. The bucket is then raised high enough 
that it will clear the side of the truck to be loaded, at 
which point the scoopmobile approaches the truck at right 
angles. rrhe bucket is dumped into the truck, whereupon 
the scoopmobile is backed off again and goes back to the 
pile of coal for another load. 
The plaintiff Steven L. West testified that he left 
Salt Lake City, Utah around 2 :00 o'clock A.M. on the day 
that the accident occurred, with a load of concrete to be 
unloaded in Price, Utah. Upon arriving there, he and two 
other fellows unloaded the concrete, after which he pro-
ceeded to the American Fuel Company mine in Hunting-
ton Canyon (H. 347). The trucks were loaded in rotation 
as they came up and the plaintiff had been waiting, ac-
cording to his testimony, about a half hour for his turn 
at the tune of the accident. He had stationed himself 
across the road and about 30 feet from where the trucks 
were being loaded, and was reclining on a pile of slack 
coal, with his hat over his eyes (R. 348) he was either 
dozing or in his words was "sitting there thinking of all 
his problems" (R. 349). He heard the trucks pulling in 
to be loaded and pulling out and was aware of what was 
going on, but was not watching or paying any particular 
attention (R. 349). The first intimation he had of the 
impending accident was an instant before the truck ran 
over him (H. 350). The witness Clyde Cox testified that 
the plaintiff was in the position indicated by the X on 
the right hand side of Exhibit P-5, and that the truck 
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which was being loaded was in the position of the X 
with the T by it, on the left hand side of E:xhibit P..:5 (R. 
182). Referring to Exhibit P -4, which is reproduced here-
in for the convenience of the court, he testified that the 
plaintiff was in the position of the X near where the 
man in that photograph is standing and that the truck 
which was being loaded was in the position of the X and 
the T near the pile of coal with the front of the truck 
pointing in the direction of the arrow, which would be 
down the canyon. The scoopmobile was located in the 
position shown by the S on Exhibit P -4. He testified that 
in this position the plaintiff was 40 to 50 feet from where 
the trucks were being loaded, and at the time of the ac-
cident was lying down (R. 185); that the plaintiff 
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had his hat down over his face and looked as if he were 
asleep (R. 204). 
The witness Hal Anderson testified that on Oct. 20, 
1952 he had driven an International truck belonging to 
his brother or his dad, Miles Anderson and Clyde Ander-
son, respectively, up Huntington Canyon to the American 
Fuel Company property (R. 247). He drove up to the tip-
ple where he was told, "They are loading dust today," so 
he drove to the dust pile further down the road. He 
parked his truck on the left hand side of the road and 
waited 15 or 20 minutes (R. 250). During that time he 
talked to a number of other truckers and observed the 
plaintiff lying in the position where he was later hurt (R. 
249). When it came his turn he drove onto the road and 
backed alongside the coal pile (R. 251). He parked the 
truck right on the road or pretty close to the road, with 
the wheels turned to the left and facing down canyon, on 
an incline. He then put the brakes on and placed the ve-
hicle in first gear, after which he got out of the truck and 
walked down to talk to his brother Clyde Anderson, who 
was driving another truck and was also waiting to be 
loaded. Clyde Anderson's truck was parked a short dis-
tance further down the canyon from where the witness 
had left his truck. He had observed Clyde Cox put the 
first scoop load of coal into his truck, but was not paying 
much attention and did not see him put any more coal in 
the truck (R. 256). He had been talking to his brother 
(R. 257) when he heard someone yell, "Your truck is 
moving!" He turned and started to run after it. The 
front end of the truck when he first saw it was already 
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across the road (R. 257). He crossed in front (R. 285) 
and to the left hand side of the truck. Just as he got to 
the left door, it stopped of its own accord. At that point 
Clyde Cox said, "There is a man under your truck," and 
they started digging him out (R. 262). 
He testified that while he was still at the scene of 
the accident before the coal had been dumped out of the 
truck, the emergency brake was tested by letting the truck 
coast off a steep grade up canyon and pulling the emer-
gency brake on, which caused the rear wheels to slide 
(R. 263). The defendant Clyde Cox testified that after 
Hal Anderson had parked his truck, he got out of it and 
walked 30 to 40 feet down the canyon from where he was 
loading to where Mr. Anderson's brother was (see the 
black cross on Exhibit P-5, marked "XCA" (R. 191). 
He had put 2 or 3 loads into the truck during which time 
he had noted no movement on the part of the truck other 
than settling on its springs as it took the loa:d (R. 184). 
After putting in the last or third load, the witness backed 
the scoopmobile in a circle approximately 10 feet behind 
where the truck had been standing (R. 205) and was in 
the process of shifting to go forward for another scoop 
load, when he observed that the truck was moving (R. 
184). At that time the truck was about 30 feet from him. 
He called to the plaintiff, "Look out, 'Steve!" (R. 184) 
and observed the truck roll to where the plaintiff Steve 
West had been lying (R. 208). He shut off the motor of 
the scoop and went over to where the truck was at that 
time unaware that the accident ha:d happened. Not see-
ing the plaintiff around anywhere, he concluded that he 
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must be under the truck. He and Clyde Anderson grabbed 
shovels and dug as fast as they could to get the plaintiff 
out from under the truck, after which plaintiff was taken 
by ambulance to the Price City Hospital (R. 206). 
Cox further testified that he did not brnnp the truck 
during the process of loading it (R. 195). The coal was 
dumped into the truck when the bucket was approximate-
ly a foot above the side of the truck bed. He testified that 
he had been loading trucks in this same manner for about 
2 years, during which time he had never observed a truck 
roll free (R.. 202). He further testified that it was the 
custom of the truckers to remain near the truck during 
the process of loading although because of the dust they 
usually left the cab; that they would get on top of the 
truck after he had them partially loaded and straighten 
the coal around so that they could get as much weight 
on the truck as possible (R. 203). 
Clyde Anderson testified that on the day of the ac-
cident, he was at the American Fuel Company mine (R. 
482) waiting to be loaded (R. 487); that he was parked 
down hill or down the canyon from where the scoopmobile 
was operating (R. 458) talking to his brother Hal (R. 
453). He had observed the truck being parked and had 
observed Clyde Cox put one scoop of coal in the truck. 
He was not, however, watching the truck at the time it 
started to move. Hal had hollered that his truck was 
moving and when he observed the truck at that time, 
it was almost to where Steve was lying (R. 453). 
The coal from the American F'uel Company mine 
was being hauled under a con tract with the Eastern 
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Utah Development Cmnpany of which company Mr. Max 
Fawcett is the manager (R. 373-4) under an arrangement 
whereby the court determined the Andersons were in-
dependent contractors. 
On December 30 or 31, 1953 the truck which had been 
involved in this accident was reassembled and. put in the 
same condition that it was on the day of the accident (R. 
467), it was then taken to the premises of the American 
Fuel Company. Hal Anderson, Clyde Anderson, Rex 
Hanson, a photographer, Frank Stauffer, a deputy 
sheriff and Clyde Cox were present (R. 467-9). Hal 
Anderson parked the truck in the exact spot where it 
had been parked on the day of the accident. He put the 
truck in first gear and pulled the emergency brake on 
tight, as he testified he had done on the day of the acci-
dent. The truck was then examined by Max F'awcett and 
by Deputy Sheriff Frank Stauffer to make certain that 
the truck was in gear and the brakes were on. Clyde Cox 
then took the same scoopmobile and put a load of coal in 
the truck in the same manner from the same position as 
on the day the accident occurred (R. 470). Mr. Cox then 
reloaded the scoopmobile and was advised this time to 
bump the truck as hard as he could without endangering 
himself, which was done. On the third load, he raised 
the scoopmobile bucket to its extreme height and com-
pletely dropped the entire amount of coal from the bucket 
into the truck from that distance. The truck bounced up 
and down and shook, but did not move forward. Cox then 
reloaded the scoopmobile, drove it around behind the 
truck and did his best to try to push the truck forward 
10 
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down the canyon. The wheels did not turn, but did slide 
forward some 14 to 16 inches. A movie of this experiment 
was taken and introduced into evidence (Exhibit M21). 
The plaintiff testified as part of the evidence on 
damages that during the year 1951 he made around $2,-
400 prospecting and hauling coal (R. 336-7), and that 
during the year 1952 he made around $2,600 (R. 337); 
that at the time of the accident, he was earning $300 per 
month, with withholding tax taken out (R. 345). This 
was the only evidence on his loss of earning capacity. 
STATEMENT OF· POINTS 
POINT I. THE DEFENDANTS MALCOLM N. Mc-
KINNON AND CLYDE COX WERE NOT GUILTY OF ANY 
NEGLIGENCE WHICH WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF 
THE IN JURY TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
POINT II. PLAINTIFF WAS HIMSELF GUILTY OF 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WHICH WAS A PROXI-
MATE CAUSE OF HIS OWN INJURY. 
POINT III. THE .COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUC-
TIONS AND IN SUBMITTING ISSUES TO THE JURY 
WHICH WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
AND OVER-ACCENTUATED PLAINTIFF'S THEORY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DEFENDANTS MALCOLM N. Mc-
KINNON AND CLYDE COX WERE NOT GUILTY OF ANY 
NEGLIGENCE WHICH WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF 
THE INJURY TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
At the close of the evidence, defendants Malcolm 
N. McKinnon and Clyde Cox moved for a directed verdict 
upon the grounds that no act or conduct on the part of 
Clyde Cox could have been a legal proximate cause of 
the accident; that the evidence conclusive'ly showed that 
11 
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if the brakes on the truck had been set or the vehicle 
placed in proper gear that the loading operation would 
not have caused it to roll forward, upon the further 
ground that Clyde Cox was entitled to assunw until it 
reasonably appeared to the contrary that the truck would 
be left with its brakes fully applied and in proper gear 
before he commenced to loa;d it, that there was nothing 
to put him on notice to the contrary in the evidence. The 
motion was taken under advisement by the court and 
among other issues, the court submitted to the jury the 
issues of whether Clyde Cox was negligent in: 
(a) bumping the truck with the scoopmobile; 
(b) in dumping large loads of coal into the truck 
from a height greater than that which a reasonably pru-
dent person would have used under the existing circum-
stances; 
(c) in failing to ascertain that the dump truck was 
so securely braked or blocked that it would not roll down 
hill while being loaded; and 
(d) in proceeding to load the dump truck while it 
was unattended. 
The jury absolved Clyde Cox of negligence under 
(a) and (b) but found that he was negligent in (c) and 
(d), but on the latter issue found that his negligence 
was not a proximate cause of the accident (R. 495-6). 
As a result of the jury's findings, the only issue raised by 
the defendants' motion for a directed verdict is: was 
there sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the issue 
of whether Clyde Cox was negligent by "failing to as-
12 
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certain that the dump truck was so securely braked or 
the wheels blocked, before starting to load it; and was 
he required to foresee that if this was not done, the truck 
would roll down hill and against and upon the plaintiff1 
There was no evidence at the trial that C1yde Cox 
exercised any supervision or control over the operation 
of the truck. 
In determining whether Clyde Cox was negligent un-
der the circmnstances, it should be kept in mind that 
the motion picture submitted in evidence showed con-
clusively that if the truck was properly braked, it would 
not roll forward because of the force connected with or 
resulting from the loading operation. The court will re-
caH that Clyde Cox testified and the motion pictures veri-
fied when the experiment was made that he was instruct-
ed to hit the side of the truck with the scoopmobile with 
as much force as possible without jeopardizing the equip-
ment or his own safety, and that after 3 scoops of coal 
had been dumped into the truck, he attempted to push 
the truck down hill with the scoopmobile but was unable 
to do more than skid the truck's rear wheels, which show-
ed that failure to block the wheels had nothing to do 
with causing the accident, that no action on the part of 
Clyde Cox caused the truck to roH down the hill, and 
the jury so found in their answers to the interrogatories. 
If nothing Clyde Cox did caused the truck to 
roll, and he did not supervise the mechanical operation 
of the truck, would he have any more duty to ascertain 
if the truck was securely braked or the wheels blocked 
than any other person who happened to be in the vicinity1 
13 
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If Stephen West could assume the truck was securely 
braked, was not Clyde Cox entitled to the same assump-
tion~ 
The evidence was also undisputed that Clyde Cox 
was employed solely as a handyman on the premises. 
One of his duties was to operate the scoopmobile. He 
was not familiar with the mechanism of this truck or 
the various types of trucks whose owners drove them 
on to the premises to purchase coal. Inasmuch as most 
of the drivers owned their own trucks, they were anxious 
to get loaded and be on their way as soon as possible. 
The custom was to load the trucks in the order in which 
they arrived. The evidence showed that the braking 
mechanism and gear ratio of modern day trucks are 
complicated and, of course, the average person in ob-
serving the truck would not know whether it was partially 
or securely braked. Cox was unfamiliar with the truck's 
mechanism. 
The truck involved in this accident was equipped 
with an Eaton two-speed, rear axle, the safe operation 
of which required the truck to be parked in low gear 
range on a down grade, because if left in high range, 
after the vacuum part of the mechanism had become 
equalized, a spring would attempt to pull the gear from 
high range to low range, and if the cogs on the gears 
happened to be on dead center so that the gears could 
not mesh, there was nothing to prevent the truck from 
moving forward in free wheeling as the emergency brake 
or transmission gear would then have no effect on the 
movement of the truck's rear wheels. Was it unreason-
14 
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able for Clyde Cox to assume that the drivers of the 
trucks; in this case, Hal Anderson's concern for the 
safety of the truck, would not result in his taking the 
necessary precautions to see that the truck was in good 
mechanical condition and that the brakes were properly 
set~ Even if he had climbed down off his scoopmobile, 
walked over to the truck and looked inside the cab, he 
would not have known whether the truck was properly 
parked in low gear range. Was Clyde Cox in his capacity 
required to anticipate not only that Hal Anderson had 
not properly braked the truck, but also that Stephen 
West would be so inattentive as to be injured if the truck 
rolled forward~ The evidence showed that the truck 
was somewhere between 30 and 50 feet from the plain-
tiff. By moving to either side, he could have avoided 
this accident if he had observed the truck start to roll 
toward him. If West was entitled to assume that the 
truck was properly braked, and he must have done so, 
as he had his hat over his eyes and apparently was either 
oblivious or unconcerned about the fact that the truck 
was pointed in his direction while being loaded, was not 
Clyde Cox entitled to the same assumption~ 
The defendants were not insurers of the safety of 
those who might come to their premises for coal. Their 
duty was only to exercise reasonable and ordinary care 
under the circumstances. The general rule is stated by 
our Supreme Court in the case of Quinn. v. Gas & Coke 
Company, 42 Utah 113, 129 P. 362, as follows: 
"What legal duty did appellant owe respond-
ent as one of its customers~ It was the duty to 
exercise ordinary care and diligence to provide 
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and maintain a reasonably safe place for ingres8 
and egress to and from its place of business for 
its customers, and to exercise the same degree 
of care and diligence to prevent injury to them 
and to their property while they were lawfully in 
its place of business or on its premises. Appellant, 
however, was not an insurer of the safety of its 
customer; nor was it required to avoid all acci-
dents, either to them or their property, at its 
peril. The respondent, therefore, was required 
to show that appellant in some way had omitted 
to exercise that degree of care and diligence for 
her safety stated above, and that by reason of 
such want of care her dress was injured as al-
leged .... " 
The duty of the owner of the premises toward an 
invitee a.rises from his superior knowledge of the pre-
mises and where, as in this case, the danger inherent in 
a situation, if any, is as obvious to the invitee as it is 
to the owner of the premises, the owner has no duty to 
warn the invitee. In the case of AustVn. v. Riverside 
Portland Cement Co., (Cal.) 271 P2 943, an action was 
brought for injuries sustained by contractor's employees 
who received electrical shocks when contractor's crane 
came into contact with overhead power line on defendant 
cement company's premises. The court held that the 
evidence on issues of whether defendant had had superior 
knowledge of the dangerous condition or had failed to 
exercise ordinary care in providing a safe place to work 
did not support a finding that the defendant had 
breached its duty to plaintiffs. The court said: 
''The general rules as to the duty owed by an 
owner of land to an invitee thereon are well set-
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tled. l-Ie owes a duty to have his premises in a 
reasonably safe condition, and to give warning 
of latent or concealed perils which are known to 
him and not to the other. The owner is not an 
insurer as to such an invitee and the true ground 
of his liability, if any, is his superior knowledge 
of the perilous condition and the resulting danger 
to the invitee. The owner is required to use 
ordinary care for the safety of the invitee and to 
give warning of a danger attendant upon the work 
which the person invited is to do thereon if such 
danger arises from causes or conditions which are 
not readily apparent to the eye. Usually, he is 
not required to give the invitee notice of warning 
of an obvious danger." 
The evidence shows that in the two years Clyde 
Cox had been loading coal, at the mine of the American 
Fuel Company, that this was the first time that a truck 
had ever moved from its moorings and rolled down hill. 
Under such circumstances, the defendant had no duty 
to anticipate such would be the case in this instance. As 
stated in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Neg-
ligence, sub-section (e), page 817: 
"As stated in Section 290, comments (f) to 
(h), the actor is required to recognize the fact 
that a certain number of animals and human 
beings may act in a way which is not customary 
in the great mass thereof, and that there are 
occasional exhibitions of the operation of natural 
forces which are radically different from the 
normal. It would, however, be impractical to set 
a standard of behavior so high as to require every 
man under all circumstances to take into account 
the chances of these exceptional actions and opera-
tions. rrherefore, except where the actor has 
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reason to expect the contrary, he is entitled to 
assume that human beings and animals will act 
and that natural forces will operate in their usual 
manner, unless their exception or action or opera-
tion would create a serious chance of grave harm 
to some valuable interest and there is little utility 
in the actor's conduct. Thus, a motorist approach-
ing an intersection of two highways, is entitled 
to assume that the other motorists on the inter-
section highways will observe the rules of the 
road, since motor traffic would be unreasonably 
delayed unless motorists were permitted to act 
on such assumptions. On the other hand, a motor-
ist approaching a railroad crossing is not entitled 
to assume that the railroad company will comply 
with its duties to blow the whistles and ring the 
bell, but is required to take very great precautions 
to look out for trains, which have not given such 
notice of their approach." 
In Martin v. Stevens (Utah) 243 P2 747, where it 
was argued that a driver was negligent in entering an 
intersection upon the assumption the other driver would 
yield the right of way, it was said at page 751 of the 
Pacific Reporter: 
" .... He was not obligated to anticipate either 
that other drivers would drive negligently, or 
would fail to accord him his right of way, until 
in the exercise of due care, he observed, or should 
have observed, something to warn him that the 
other driver was driving negligently, or would 
fail to accord him his right of way. If this princi-
ple is not clear in the earlier cases, it is firmly 
established by the more recent expressions of 
this court." 
The rule announced in Hilliard v. Utah By-Products 
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Cornpany, 1 Utah (.:2) 287, 263 P(2) 287, is particularly 
applicable to the evidence in this case, not only as to 
whether Clyde Cox should have foreseen the negligent 
conduct on the part of Hal Anderson in parking the 
truck, but also as to his duty to foresee that the plaintiff 
would not exercise reasonable care for his own safety: 
"In applying the test of foreseeability to 
situations where a negligently created pre-existing 
condition combines with a later act of negligence 
causing an injury, the courts have drawn a clear-
cut distinction between two classes of cases. The 
first is where one has negligently created a 
dangerous condition (such as parking a truck) 
and a later actor observed, or circumstances are 
such that he could not fail to observe, but negli-
gently failed to avoid it. The second situation 
involves conduct of a later intervening actor who 
failed to observe the dangerous condition until it 
was too late to avoid it. In regard to the firs• 
situation, it is held as a matter of law that the 
latter intervening act does interrupt the natural 
sequence of events and cuts off the legal effect 
of the negligence of the initial actor. This is bas~ed 
upon the reasoning that it is not reasonably to 
be foreseen nor expect,ed that one who actually 
becomes cognizant of a dangerous condition in 
ample time to avoid injury will fail to do so. On 
the other hand, with respect to the second situa-
tion, where the second actor fails to see the danger 
in time to avoid it, it is held that a jury question 
exists based on the rational that it can be reason-
ably anticipated that circumstances may arise 
wherein others may not observe the dangerous 
condition until too late to avoid it. The distinction 
is basically one between a situation in which the 
second actor has sufficient time, after being 
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charged with knowledge of the hazard, to avoid it 
and one in which the second actor negligently be-
comes confronted with an emergency situation." 
So say we here, until reasonably put on notice to 
the contrary, Cox was entitled to assume that Hal Ander-
son would use reasonable care in parking a truck which 
was in a reasonably safe mechanical condition. 
In the case of Mehl v. Carter, 237 P2 240 (Kan.), 
an action was brought to recover damages to realty 
caused by a fire which started in a building owned by the 
defendant. The evidence showed that the defendant kept 
gasoline on the premises in violation of certain city or-
dinances. The evidence further showed that the recep-
tacle containing the gasoline was knocked over by per-
sons having no connection with the defendant, the gas 
becoming ignited and causing the fire and resulting 
damage. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant 
and the appellants contended that the defendant was 
liable as a matter of law. Upon the question of whether 
he should have foreseen the fire, the court said: 
''Of course, a person cannot without liability 
create a condition which, in the exercise of rea-
sonable care, should cause him to realize that 
injury is probable or likely to occur but a person 
is not liable for a consequence which is merely 
possible but not likely to occur. Stated in another 
way, one is bound to anticipate and provide 
against that which usually happens or is likely 
to happen but it would impose too heavy a burden 
to be held responsible for guarding against what 
is unusual or unlikely to happen and what has 
been said to be only remotely or slightly probable. 
(Citations given) ..... Had appellee's employees 
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knocked the can off the bench in the course of 
his duties a different question would be presented 
with respect to what appellee reasonably should 
have anticipated. But that is not this law suit. 
We think we would not be justified in concluding 
as a matter of law that appellee, in the exercise 
of reasonable care should have anticipated the 
danger of some outsider going behind a work 
bench and there disturbing tools or equipment 
located at the rear of such a bench. Surely ap-
pellee was not obligated, as a matter of law, to 
anticipate a scuffle by outsiders would be pro-
bable or was likely to occur at such a place .... " 
"In the Rowell case, supra, 162 Kan. 294, 
176 P2 592, it was held: 'Natural and probable 
consequences are those which human foresight 
can anticipate because they happen so frequently 
they may be expected to recur.'" 
In this case, any act of the defendants Malcolm N. 
McKinnon and Clyde Cox was twice removed from the 
injury to the plaintiff. Not only do we have the inter-
vening negligence of the defendant Hal Anderson, but 
we also have the conduct of the plaintiff in stationing 
himself in a position of peril in front of the defendant 
Hal Anderson's truck, oblivious to what was going on 
around him. Considering the experience of the defend-
ant- that during the 2 years that Clyde Cox had been 
loading trucks in the past, no truck had ever rolled for-
ward while being loaded and that it was not the practice 
to block the wheels - the finding of the jury that the 
defendant Clyde Cox was negligent goes beyond the 
limits of what might reasonably be foreseen by him and 
makes the defendants Insurers of the safety of every 
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person who might choose to enter upon the prmnises of 
the defendants. 
POINT II. PLAINTIFF WAS HIMSELF GUILTY OF 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WHICH WAS A PROXI-
MATE CAUSE OF HIS OWN INJURY. 
The evidence was that the plaintiff placed himself 
in a position down hill and slightly off to the other side 
of the road from the point where the trucks were being 
loaded and then proceeded to ignore the activities which 
were going on, although he was aware that trucks were 
being loaded and moving in and out of the area all the 
time. Had he either selected a safer spot in which to 
recline or been attentive to the activity which was going 
on around him, he could have avoided this accident almost 
up to the very second in which it happened. The truck 
was moving slowly. Hal Anderson testified he had time 
to run in front of it before the forward momentum stop-
ped (R 285). 
Plaintiff claims that the defendants should have 
been aware of the dangers inherent in this situation and 
taken precautions to protect the plaintiff, while contend-
ing that plaintiff, who was himself aware of the same 
situation, should be absolved for ignoring the perils in-
herent in the situation. 
The rule announced in Hooten .et al v. City of Bur-
ley (Ida.), 219 P2 651, is particularly applicable to this 
case. In that case, the defendant, a municipal corpora-
tion, disconnected 2 lead wires from a pole on the west 
side of a street, and coiled them up and hung them in a 
small tree so that a Mr. Aldrich and the person for whose 
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death this action was brought could remove some trees 
from the premises of a man named Carson. At the time 
the wires were disconnected, the current in the wires was 
turned off, but it was turned on by an automatic time 
switch about 5 :15 p.m. of the same day. The deceased, 
noticing that the wires were flashing and emitting 
sparks, was seen near the wires and then later found on 
the ground with one of the coils of wire around his body. 
No one actually saw him touch the wires. The court 
relying on the presumption that the deceased exercised 
due care for his own safety held that under the evidence 
whether or not he was contributorily negligent was a 
question for the jury. In so doing, however, they an-
nounced the following rules of law, which we believe are 
applicable to this case: 
"It is a general rule of law that if one knows 
of the danger brought about by the negligence of 
another, and understands and appreciates the risk 
therefrom, and voluntarily exposes himself to 
such danger, he is precluded from recovering for 
resulting injuries. 
"Further where one claiming damages for 
personal injuries contributes to the injury by want 
of ordinary care by placing himself in the dan-
gerous position where he might be injured, and 
does not exercise ordinary care in preventing in-
jury to himself after being placed in such a posi-
tion, then the mere fact than another was negli-
gent would not relieve the one injured from the 
effects of his contributory negligence, and if the 
person injured could have avoided such circum-
stances by the exercise of reasonable care and 
prudence, then no recovery can he had ... " 
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In Restatement of the Law, Torts, Section 340, Page 
927, it is said: 
"A possessor of land is not subject to lia-
bility to his licensees, whether business visitors 
or gratuitious licensees, for bodily harm caused 
to them by any dangerous condition thereon, 
whether natural or artificial, if they know of the 
condition and realize the risk involved therein." 
In Murriay v. R~alph D'Oench Co. (Mo.), 147 SW2 
623, 13 Negligence Cases 638, the plaintiff, a woman 72 
years of age, went to a beauty parlor and when she ar-
rived she was informed by the attendants that they were 
cleaning up a spot on the floor. The janitor employed by 
defendant testified that he cleaned the beauty parlor 
every morning before any customers arrived and that 
as he was finishing up he was asked to try to remove 
a stain on the floor. One of the attendants sprinkled 
some cleaning powder on the floor and rubbed it with 
his mop. He mopped the spot with the wet mop and in-
tended to do so with the dry mop but was prevented from 
doing so because customers were due. Plaintiff testified 
that she saw the damp spot when it was pointed out up-
on her entrance. The defendant appealed from a judg-
ment for the plaintiff and the court used this language: 
"We have held that the true ground of lia-
bility (of an owner or occupant of lands to an 
invitee) is the proprietor's superior knowledge 
of an unsafe condition and its dangers. We have, 
therefore, ruled, where the condition is so open 
and obvious that it is as apparent to the invitee 
as to the owner or where the condition is actually 
known to the invitee, that there is no liability; 
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otherwise, the proprietor would be in effect an 
insurer." 
In Kitchen v. Women's City Club (Mass.) 166 NE 
554, the facts were that the defendant, a Club organized 
to establish acquaintance among women and to provide 
a club house where members might meet informally, main-
tained such a house in Boston; the plaintiff and three 
other women were recei-v-ed as guests at the club house. 
The floor of the club house was of hard wootl and was 
highly polished. While in her room she heard a knock at 
the door and started for the door and slipped on the 
middle of the rug, which was pushed against the mantle, 
and the plaintiff was thrown to the floor whereby she 
sustained injuries. A motion for directed verdict was 
granted. Says the court: 
"That the defendant owed a duty to its pay-
ing guests to use reasonable care that the prem-
ises as a whole, and the rooms assigned to the use 
of the guests in particular, should be reasonably 
fit and safe for such use is obvious. And it is 
plain that it is its duty to take fair and reasonable 
precautions that the guest is informed and warned 
against all damages incident to the enjoyment of 
club privileges, which are not obvious to the senses 
of an ordinarily intelligent person. As a corollary, 
it follows that no duty is owed to a guest, where 
the conditions are op.en wnd obvious to an ordin-
arily intelligent person, to make changes in such 
conditions or call attention to da,ngers which are 
apparent to the senses of such a person. If the 
law is applied to the facts of this case, the verdicts 
were directed rightly. The plaintiff knew all the 
conditions of which she complains, she knew that 
light rugs when stepped on may be expected to 
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
slip on slippery floors, but she did not anticipate 
that the rug in the roorn in question would slip 
on the floor of that room. She appreciated and 
voluntarily assumed the risk of any accident which 
naturally attached to the condition she observed, 
and by assenting negatived the existence of any 
duty on the part of the defendant to warn her of 
such dangers ... We are of the opinion the plain-
tiffs have no right of action for the causes alleged 
in their pleadings or for any cause which the testi-
mony would support." 
A business invitee has a duty to exercise reasonable 
care for his own protection. In the case of Knox v. Snow, 
(Utah) 229 P2 874, the plaintiff went upon the premises 
of defendant, a service station operator, for the pur-
pose of purchasing. a tire for his car. The defendant 
informed him that he did not have a tire but might have 
an interliner suitable for the plaintiff's purposes. The 
plaintiff observed through the door of the sales room 
out in the repair shop at the far end of the shop there 
was an interliner which he thought would be suitable. 
At that point, without any directions from Allen, he 
proceeded toward the tire racks and was injured when 
he fell into a grease rack. The court said: 
". . . For the purpose of this case, we shall 
assume plaintiff was an invited business visitor 
when he entered and while he was in the work 
room. In spite of this assumption, we have great 
doubts as to whether the evidence establishes 
negligence on the part of the defendants. How-
ever, we pass that question and affirm the judg-
ment because plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law." 
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rrhe general rule regarding contributory negligence 
is stated on page 861 of 38 Am. Jur., as follows: 
"It is said that when the defense of contribu-
tory negligence is urged as ground for a nonsuit, 
it must appear that reasonable men, acting as the 
triers of the fact, would find, without any reason-
able probability of differing in their views, either 
that the plaintiff knew and appreciated the dan-
ger, or that ordinarily prudent men under the 
same circumstances would readily acquire such 
knowledge and appreciation. As it generally is 
expressed, a plaintiff will not be held to have been 
guilty of contributory negligence if it appears 
that he had no knowledge or means of knowledge 
of the danger. . . " 
In this instance, the plaintiff had, or under the cir-
cumstances should have had, the same knowledge of the 
situation or any danger to himself arising from the posi-
tion of the truck as did the defendant Clyde Cox. The 
probability of the truck rolling forward if not properly 
braked was obvious to anyone in the vicinity. He had 
within his power the means of preventing his own injury 
by the simple precaution of moving to a spot of greater 
safety. Had he looked, by moving a few feet to either 
side, he could have avoided the truck after it started to 
move. By voluntarily placing himself in a position of 
danger and continuing to remain therein, he assumed 
any risk inherent to the situation and sho'Uld be pre-
cluded from recovery by reason of his own contributory 
negligence. 
In Wold v. Ogden City et al (Utah) 258 P2 453, the 
plaintiff brought action against the city and a construe-
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tion company for mjuries sustained when plaintiff fell 
into a ditch which had been dug in the street in front of 
his house. The trial court dismissed the action and this 
Honorable Court upheld the dismissal on the grounds 
that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence 
and had assumed a known risk, and was, therefore, pre-
cluded as a matter of law from recovering against the 
city or contractor for his injury. 
The facts were that the plaintiff, in the afternoon, 
had observed a trench 4 feet deep and 2¥2 feet wide dug 
in the street in front of his home. Upon coming home 
with his wife late at night and in order to avoid walking 
one-half block to either end of the trench, he straddled 
the trench at a very dark place in order to help his wife 
across, but fell in the trench when the wall gave way. 
The court said : 
"Without discussing the matter of which 
grounds the trial court relied on in making its de-
cision, we believe that he specifically based his 
decision either on contributory negligence, claimed 
as error by the appellant, or the doctrine of as-
sumption of risk, no error was committed and 
therefore appellant was not deprived of any con-
stitutional right to a jury trial. .. 
"Plaintiff admitted the hazardous condition 
in his complaint. Also in his brief when he said, 
'We have presented by the facts of this appeal a 
situation of appellant exposing himself to a known 
danger in order to exercise the right and privilege 
which he has to use the highways and streets.' But 
such right and privilege are not without limita-
tion and certainly cannot include the prerogative 
of use without the exercise of due care. It would 
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semn that a reasonable, prudent person would 
not expose himself to a known danger when there 
is an easy, known and convenient route around 
it. Plaintiff's conduct, aside from the concept 
of assumption of risk, was unreasonable in the 
light of this known hazard and the existence of 
a convenient, hardly burdensome detour at the 
intersection of Grant and Eighteenth Street, 
where the trench ended and through which plain-
tiff had driven shortly before his injury. To de-
liberately attempt to cross under such circum-
stances seems to be that type of lack of due care 
not attributable to the ordinarily prudent person 
exercising care for his own safety. 
"Plaintiff also was precluded, having assum-
ed the risk of injury under the circumstances 
of this case. vV e emphasize the fact that he knew 
of the hazard of 4 :00 p.m. and at 2 :30 a.m. when he 
'looked the situation over.' The doctrine of as-
sumption of risk, ordinarily applicable to an em-
ployer-employee relation, has been extended to 
some situations where one knows of a condition 
and concludes to accept its attendant hazards and 
acts accordingly without force or of necessity. 
"Dean Prosser points up this principle as it 
applies to the instant case when he asserts that 
an objective standard must maintain, and that 'the 
plaintiff cannot be heard to say that he did not 
comprehend a risk which must have been obvious 
to him.' Further that 'as in the case of negligence 
there are certain risks which anyone of adult age 
must be taken to appreciate: the danger of slip-
ping on ice, or falling through unguarded open-
ings,' etc. He goes on to say that 'In the usual 
case, his knowledge and appreciation of danger 
will be a question for the jury; but where it is 
clear that any person of normal intelligence in 
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his position must have understood the danger, 
the issue must be decided by the court.' 
"We think the facts of this case bring it with-
in the principles announced, and it is no answer 
to say that plaintiff may not have known the bank 
of the trench would give way, since no adult per-
son of ordinary intelligence, knowing of the 
trench, would take such chances on what counsel 
characterizes as being an 'extremely dark area, 
no lights, and in the middle of the night and in 
the shade of the trees,' where there was an easy 
and safe access to his home in a matter of min-
utes." 
Nor can we absolve the plaintiff merely by reason 
of the fact that he failed to observe the dangers of his 
situation. In the case of Scofield v. Sprouse-Reitz Com-
pany (Utah) 265 P2 396, a salesman, calling upon the 
defendant's store manager, on office platform, mounted 
stairs wliich were adequately lighted but which were 
without a hand rail. In turning to go down the stairs, 
the salesman lost his balance and pitched over the side 
of the stairway. This court held that the salesman was 
guilty of negligence as a matter of law. After discussing 
the Knox v. Snow case, supra, the court said: 
"The present case presents an even more ob-
vious situation for contributory negligence than 
in the Knox case, for it does not require that we 
attribute to plaintiff knowledge of the particular 
type of place. He had ample opportunity to ob-
serve and, as a reasonably prudent man, should 
have looked to locate the hand rail before he at-
tempted to put his weight on it. The light was 
sufficient, he knew that he was on a platform, and 
although he may have been preoccupied with try-
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ing to make a sale, he 1nust be held to take the 
sin1ple precaution of a quick glance to assure .J.im-
self of safety as would a reasonably prudent man. 
Likewise the store manager would have no reason 
to suspect that plaintiff had not observed the lack 
of a hand rail on his way up the stairs and would 
not feel it necessary to warn him as he started 
down the stairs of a condition which was obvious 
to all." 
The verdict of the jury in this case places us on the 
horns of a dilemna by reason of its very inconsistency. 
They found that the defendant Hal Anderson was negli-
gent in failing to set the brakes of the truck and in turn-
ing the front wheels of the truck in a down hill direction 
when parking the same, and that the defendant Clyde Cox 
was guilty of negligence in failing to ascertain that the 
truck was securely braked or blocked. None of these 
acts were negligent unless the probability of injury could 
be foreseen or should have been foreseen by the defend-
ants. VVe must, therefore, introduce a third element into 
the picture, and that is the presence of the plaintiff in a 
position where he might be injured if the truck should 
roll down hill and turn to the left in rolling. What the 
jury has in effect said by its verdict is that the defendant 
Hal Anderson was negligent in failing to set the brakes 
of the truck and turning the front wheels of the truck 
in a down hill direction by reason of the fact that he 
should have foreseen that the truck might roll down hill 
and roll onto the plaintiff, and that the defendant Clyde 
Cox was negligent in failing to ascertain if the truck was 
securely braked or blocked, because he should have anti-
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cipated that Hal Anderson would negligently fail to set 
the truck brakes, permitting it to roll onto the plaintiff, 
but that the plaintiff, to whom the situation was equally 
apparent was not negligent in placing himself in a posi-
tion where he might be injured if such occurred and that 
he had no duty to ascertain or anticipate that if the 
brakes of the truck were not set or the front wheels of the 
truck turned in a down hill direction that the truck might 
roll onto him. Therefore, they are saying what should 
have been apparent to the defendants as reasonable and 
prudent men should not have been apparent to the plain-
tiff under the same circumstances as a reasonable and 
prudent man. This, of course, 1nakes the standard of care 
dependent not as it should be on the question of whether 
or not the actor, be he plaintiff or defendant, acted as 
reasonable and prudent men under the circumstances 
would act, but rather whether he is plaintiff or defendant. 
We contend that as a matter of law, under the evidence, 
neither the defendant Cox nor the plaintiff West were 
negligent in failing to anticipate Hal Anderson's negli-
gence. In this instance both were entitled to assume that 
the defendant Hal Anderson had exercised reasonable 
care to set the truck brakes and place it in low range 
gear so that it would remain in position during the load-
ing operation; however, if Cox was negligent in failing 
to anticipate that Hal Anderson would be negligent, and 
West would be injured thereby, was not West under an 
equal if not a greater duty to likewise anticipate Ander-
son's negligence and the probability of injury to himself. 
After all, his personal safety was involved. We submit 
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that if under these circumstances Cox was negligent, then 
West must also have been contributorily negligent as a 
matter of law. 
POINT III. THE .COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUC-
TIONS, SUBMITTING ISSUES TO THE JURY WHICH 
WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND OVER-
ACCENTUATED PLAINTIFF'S THEORY. 
In the second point of this brief, we have already 
discussed the court's error in submitting the issues of 
negligence on the part of the defendants Malcolm N. Mc-
Kinnon and Clyde Cox, which was not warranted under 
the evidence in the case or the law applicable thereto. 
Specifically, the issue that these defendants were negli-
gent in failing to ascertain that the truck was securely 
braked or blocked so that it would not run down hill while 
being loaded. We will not, therefore, discuss the matter 
further here. 
The court's instructions placed undue emphasis on 
the plaintiff's theory of the case and did not give eqnal 
emphasis to the theory of the defendants. Let us first 
review the instruction dealing with the duties of the 
various parties : 
In instruction number 10, the court instructed the 
JUry: 
"You are instructed that Hal Anderson owed 
Steven L. West a duty to use reasonable care n•Jt 
to injure him, and he had a further duty to con-
duct himself in regard to the manner in which he 
parked and attended his truck as a reasonably 
prudent man would do under the same or similar 
circumstances. In determining whether or not Hal 
Anderson used ordinary care and conducted him-
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self as a reasonably prudent man, you should take 
into consideration the lay of the land, the manner 
in which the wheels of the truck were turned when 
it was abandoned, the amount of care and consid-
eration which was given to the truck after it was 
parked and while it was being loaded, and all of 
the surrounding circumstances existing at the time 
of the happening of the event in question." 
The court will note that the instruction goes into 
great detail as to the matters which might be taken into 
consideration and should have been sufficient for all 
purposes; however, the court reiterated the same point 
thereby giving them overemphasis in instruction number 
11, which was to the effect: 
"You are further instructed that in parking 
his truck on a down hill grade at the loading 
place, Hal Anderson had a duty to set the hand 
brake securely before leaving his truck unattend-
ed; and if he failed to do this, he would be guilty 
of negligence. 
"You are further instructed that it was his 
duty to turn the front wheels of the truck in such 
a manner that it would not run down hill if the 
brakes should become loosened; and if a reason-
ably prudent person in the exercise of ordinary 
care would have foreseen that the brakes might 
loosen and the truck leave its stationary position, 
then the said Hal Anderson would be negligent 
in leaving the wheels pointing in a down hill 
direction." 
Although these two instructions were concerned with 
the issue of Hal Anderson's negligence, inasmuch as the 
court in his instructions submitted the issue of whether 
Cox had a duty to anticipate such negligence, the instruc-
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tions over-emphasized the duty of Cox and accentuated 
the plaintiff's theory of recovery. 
In instruction number 12, the court undertook to 
instruct the jury on the negligence of Clyde Cox and it 
will be noted that the court did so in very positive langu-
age, setting out specifically the duty of Clyde Cox and 
again went into great detail in the manner in which he 
may have been guilty of a breach of that duty. 
Instruction number 12 was as follows: 
"You are further instructed that Steven L. 
West was a business invitee upon the American 
Fuel Company property, and Clyde Cox as an 
employee owed Steven L. "\Vest a duty to use rea-
sonable care to avoid harming him. That is to say, 
Clyde Cox was under an obligation to conduct him-
self in reference to his business invitees as a rea-
sonably prudent man would do under the same or 
similar circumstances. 
"In determining whether or not Clyde Cox 
failed to use ordinary care in the loading of the 
truck, you rna y take in to consideration the type 
of equipment he was using, the fact that the truck 
in which he was loading coal was unattended and 
was being loaded while the front end of the truck 
faced downhill at a grade of approximately six 
per cent, the fact that there were no blocks placed 
under the wheels of the truck while it was being 
loaded and the fact that Clyde Cox had not check-
ed to see if the truck was in gear or if the brakes 
were set thereon before he started to load the 
same. 
"If in this regard you find by a preponder-
ance of the evidence in this case that Clyde Cox 
failed to act as a reasonably prudent man would 
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have acted under the same or si1nilar circum-
stances, then I instruct you that he would be 
negligent. If on the other hand you find that 
he did act as a reasonably prudent man would 
have acted under the same or similar circum-
stances in the manner in which he loaded the 
truck, then I instruct you that he would not be 
negligent." 
The only instruction wherein the court dealt with 
the negligence of the plaintiff was instruction number 
13. You will note that the said instruction starts out with 
the assertion that Steven L. West was in a position be-
low the place where the truck was being loaded and on the 
other side of the roadway, which seemed to be an indica-
tion on the part of the court that the court felt he was 
in a safe place, and then goes on to tell them that if they 
should find that he was in a place where motor vehicles 
did not ordinarily travel, he would not he negligent. 
The court in its conclusion, realizing the error of which it 
had been guilty, did attempt to qualify the instruction by 
the admonition that if a prudent man could have foreseen 
that the truck might be set in motion and might run in 
and upon the general area in which he was reclining, 
then he would be negligent in assuming the position he 
did without keeping an adequate lookout for his own 
safety: 
''You are instructed that the evidence is un-
disputed that immediately before Steven L. West 
was injured he was sitting or reclining with his 
hat over his eyes in a position below the place 
where the truck was being loaded and on the other 
side of the roadway. You are further instructed 
that if you find from the evidence that Steven 
36 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
L. vVest was in a place which was ordinarily safe 
and upon which motor vehicles did not ordinarily 
run, he would not be negligent in taking that posi-
tion unless a reasonably prudent person at that 
time could have foreseen that a truck being loaded 
might be set in motion and would likely run into 
the area where he placed himself. However, if an 
ordinarily prudent man could have foreseen that 
a truck being loaded might be set in motion while 
being loaded and that it would likely run in and 
upon the general area where Steven L. West was 
reclining, then Steven L. West would be negligent 
in assuming the position he did without keeping an 
outlook for his own safety." 
Instruction number 13 loses sight of the general 
duty of a reasonably prudent person to exercise reason-
able care for his own safety under all the circumstances. 
It does not tell the jury that a man would be negligent in 
placing himself in a position in which a reasonably pru-
dent person would realize that he may be injured but 
merely tells them that if he did place himself in such a 
position that he must keep a lookout for his own safety. 
In the recent case of Devme v. Cook, decided by the 
Utah Supreme Court on February 7, 1955 ______ Utah ______ , 
279 P2 1073, this court held that it was error for the 
trial court to overaccentuate the duties of one party and 
minimize the duties of the other. It pointed out that this 
might be done in a number of ways, such as giving the 
instructions pertaining to one party in a positive manner 
and those pertaining to another in a negative manner 
and not giving a number of instructions on the duty of 
one party and only a few instructions on the duty of an-
other. The court said : 
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"We conclude that the Court, by the qualify-
ing terms used, cast doubt as to the existence of 
any injuries suffered by the plaintiffs and char-
acterized the conduct of the plaintiffs as negli-
gence. 
In holding that the Court erred in giving the 
instructions in this case, we cite with approval the 
law enunciated in the case of Keeshin Motor Ex-
press Co., Inc. et al v. Glassman, 219 Ind. 538, 38 
NE 2d 842, 850, in which the Court held as fol-
lows: 
'With this situation it was incumbent up-
on the trial court in his instructions to clarify 
the issues without giving any of them undue 
prominence. This was not done. The instruc-
tions as a whole are lengthy, intricate, repe-
titious, argumentative, and confusing. They 
tend, to appellant's disadvantage, by needless 
repetition to draw the jury's consideration 
away from the conduct of appellee's brother 
and to lead the jury to believe that, in the 
court's opinion, what he did or failed to do 
was of little consequence.' 
"In the case of Shields v. Utah Light & Trac-
tion Co., 99 Utah 307, 105 P. 2d 347, 349, in which 
the court stated: 'the reiteration of given propo-
sitions to the jury in the instructions does not 
have judicial approval', and after reviewing the 
detailed instructions the Court stated: 
'And the resulting emphasis on applic-
able laws unfavorable to plaintiff's side as 
the result of continual reference and repeat-
ing of certain law propositions resulted in 
the unbalancing of the charge, and error.' 
"Even assuming that the instructions of the 
38 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Court taken in their entirety could be considered 
correct as given, the continual repetition of in-
structions on contributory negligence and the posi-
tive delineation of the duties of the plaintiffs, as 
contrasted with the qualified negative statements 
of the duties of the defendants, unbalanced the 
instructions in favor of the defendants and in-
fluenced the jury in bringing its verdict of no 
cause of action as against all three plaintiffs, and 
therefore constituted reversible error." 
The trial court in this case has been guilty of the 
same error as that in D.evine v. Cook, (supra). The duties 
of the defendants in this case were outlined in a very 
detailed and positive manner. Every possible element 
of negligence conceivable under the evidence in the case 
was covered, yet in the instructions pertaining to the 
conduct of the plaintiff, this was covered in a general 
way and stated in a negative manner; that is, the court 
instructed the jury that the plaintiff was not negligent 
unless they found certain things, rather than instructing 
them in a positive manner as to his duties to use reason-
able care for his safety. 
In the special verdict under Sections VI and VII, 
the court submitted the issue of whether or not the plain-
tiff had sustained any yearly loss of earning capacity as 
a result of this accident, and the number of years during 
which such loss would continue. 
The only evidence in the record on this point dis-
closes that the plaintiff earned $2,600 per annum for 
the year 1952, as disclosed by his income tax return, and 
$2,400 during the year 1951. Since his recovery, he testi-
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fied that he had been earning approximately $300 per 
month. There was no evidence in the record whatsoever 
that he was qualified for or could earn in excess of $300 
per month were it not for the injuries he sustained in 
this accident. This being the case, there was absolutely 
no evidence in the record upon which a verdict for any 
loss of earning capacity could be based, and it was error 
to submit this issue to the jury. 
Physical injury and impairment of earning capacity 
are not synonymous and the one does not necessarily fol-
low from the other. As was said by the court in Schlatter 
v. McCarthy, 113 Utah 543, 19'6 P2 968: 
"The evidence established with reasonable 
certainty that plaintiff would sustain a permanent 
disability to his right leg of at least ten per cent. 
However, a distinction must be made between a 
permanent injury and a permanent impairment o.f 
earning capacity. The extent of the disability 
to a limb or other part of the human machine is 
not generally the measure of the extent of the im-
pairment of earning capacity. A few examples will 
illustrate: A 50% permanent disability of the left 
hand of a practicing lawyer would probably not 
impair his earning capacity to the extent of 50%. 
He would still be able to interview clients, to read 
cases, to walk to and from the court room, and to 
perform all the other duties ordinarily incident 
to the practice of his profession. On the other 
hand, a 50% permanent disability of the left hand 
of a concert pianist would probably amount to 
total impairment of his earning capacity. S.o also, 
permanent disfiguring injuries, even of a slight 
nature, might result in almost total impairment of 
earning capacity of a professional actress or, 
model, whereas serious disfigurement, unless ac-
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companied by loss of bodily function, would hard-
ly impair at all the earning capacity of a day 
laborer." 
It may be true that the plaintiff might not have been 
able to perform the same work at which he was employed 
before the accident; however, the accident in this respect 
proved a financial benefit rather than a loss, by forcing 
him into an occupation which brought him greater com-. 
pensation than he had been earning prior thereto. We 
submit that the evidence on this point is wholly insuffi-
cient to sustain the verdict. 
The court's instruction number 9 (a) correctly de-
fined the theory of law which was applicable under the 
evidence in this case to the defendants Malcolm N. Mc-
Kinnon an~ Clyde Cox. Instruction number 9'(a) pro-
vided: 
"You are further instructed that any person 
has a right to rely upon the assumption that other 
people will not be negligent unless and until some 
act is done by another person to indicate to the 
contrary." 
Under this instruction, Cox was entitled to assume 
that the defendant Anderson had securely braked his 
truck when it was parked for loading. The evidence 
shows that in all of Cox's experience, no truck had rolled 
away when parked for loading and there was nothing 
whatever to indicate to him that Anderson had not se-
curely braked his truck. He assumed, and as stated and 
implied in the above instructions, had a right to assume, 
that Anderson had not been negligent, but on the con-
trary, that he had made the truck secure in order that 
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Cox might proceed with the loading. Now, notwithstand-
ing the evidence and the above quoted instruction, the 
court unfortunately and erroneously gave that portion 
of instruction number 12, which. reads: 
''In determining whether or not Clyde Cox 
failed to use ordinary care in the loading of the 
truck, you may take into consideration the type 
of equipment he was using, the fact that the truck 
into which he was loading coal was unattended 
and was being loaded while the front end of the 
truck faced down hill at a grade of approximately 
six per cent, the fact that there were no blocks 
placed under the wheels of the truck while it was 
being loaded, and the fact that Clyde Cox had 
not checked to see if the truck was in gear or if 
the brakes were set thereon before he started to 
load the same." 
As has been shown under the authorities cited in 
Point II of this brief, the defendants Clyde Cox and 
Malcolm N. McKinnon had no such duty, for the reason 
that they were not required to anticipate the negligence 
of others and for the further reason that it was not rea-
sonably foreseeable that the defendant Anderson would 
fail to set the brakes of his truck or place the same in 
gear, and that by reason of his failure so to do, the truck 
would roll down hill and over and upon the plaintiff, and 
that the plaintiff would negligently place himself in a 
position in which he might be run over if the truck did 
roll forward and would thereafter negligently fail to 
further observe the truck or give any attention to the 
loading activities. 
Instruction number 12 is enti~ely inconsistent with 
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instruction nurnber 9 (a), for if Cox was entitled to as-
sume that Anderson had properly performed his duty 
of securely braking the truck (and there can be no ques-
tion that such was his duty), then Cox cannot be held 
liable for proceeding to load the truck under such an as-
sumption without inspecting it. In other words, by in-
struction number 12, the jury was instructed that Cox 
was liable if he failed to ascertain the condition of the 
truck, when by the other instruction, the jury was told 
in effect that he was entitled to assume that it was se-
curely braked for loading. 
"The giving of contradictory instructions is 
error." 
Konold v. Rio Grande Western Ry., 21 Utah 379, 60 P. 
1021; Jensen v. Utah Ry., 72 Utah 376, 270-P 349. In the 
Jensen case the court remarks : 
"The appellant urges that the charge given at 
the request of the defendant is in conflict with 
paragraphs 7 and 8 of the charge given at request 
of the plaintiff, and in such particular invoked the 
rule stated in Konold v. Rio Grande Western Ry., 
21 Utah 379, 60 P. 1021, 81 Am. St. Rep. 693, that 
the giving of inconsistent instructions is error and 
sufficient ground for reversal of the judgment, be-
cause, after verdict, it cannot be told which in-
struction was followed by the jury, or what influ-
ence the erroneous instruction had on their de-
liberations, and, as stated in Randall Instructions 
to Juries, 537, that where instructions of the suc-
cessful party state an erroneous rule, and those 
of the defeated party state the rule correctly, 
the only presumption permissible is that the 
jury disregarded the true rule for the false, that 
an error of instruction presenting a wrong theory 
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of the case is not cured by other instructions an, 
nouncing a right theory; and, that where instruc-
tions are in irreconcilable conflict, or so conflict-
ing as to construe or mislead the jury, the rule 
requiring instructions to be read together has no 
application." 
In State v. Waid, 92 Utah 297,67 P2 647, it was held: 
''The giving of inconsistent and contradictory 
instructions on a material point is error and suf-
ficient ground for reversal." 
Thus it is seen that the instructions are erroneous, 
not only because instruction number 12 places upon the 
defendants Malcolm N. McKinnon and Clyde Cox a duty 
which they did not have, but also because instructions 
9(a) and 12 are inconsistent. Instruction 9(a) correctly 
stated the laws of the case while instruction 12 permitted 
the jury to find against the defendants Malcolm N. Mc-
Kinnon and Clyde Cox on the basis of their failure to do 
that which instruction 9·( a) said they were not obligated 
to do. 
In the court's instruction number 17, the court re-
peated the error it had made in submitting the issue of 
loss of earning power to the jury by instructing the jury 
that in determining the amount of damages which the 
plaintiff had suffered, they should also take into consid-
eration the loss of earning capacity, if any, which Steven 
L. West has sustained. On this point, the court further 
instructed : 
"In this connection, you should award to the 
plaintiff such sum of money as you find from a 
preponderance of the evidence he has lost from 
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being unable to ('arry on his usual work since the 
date of the accident to the present time, and you 
should also consider whether or not a preponder-
ance of the evidence shows that his capacity to 
earn money in the future has been diminished. You 
are further instructed that the court will apply 
the mathematical formula to arrive at the present 
worth of future earnings if the jury will fix the 
mnount of loss in earning capacity and determine 
the number of years during which the plaintiff 
would sustain such a loss." 
Not only was this instruction erroneous for the rea-
sons pointed out above, but the last part of the instruc-
tion seems to imply that the jury should return some kind 
of finding in this regard so that the court could apply 
a mathematical formula. The foregoing practically re-
quired the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff, fur-
ther accentuating the plaintiff's theory of recovery. 
In connection therewith, the court failed to give the 
jury the usual instruction, defendants' request number 15, 
that the fact that he had instructed them on damages was 
not to be taken by the jury as an indication of whether 
he believed or did not believe that the plaintiff was en-
titled to recover. The court intended to give this request 
and indicated that he had done so (R 113); however, a 
perusal of the instruction given will show that such was 
not done. The court also apparently intended to give the 
defendant Cox's requested instruction number 6, (R 104) 
submitting the issue of unavoidable accident, and request-
ed instruction number 7 (R 105) submitting the issue of 
whether the accident was solely caused by the negligence 
of Hal Anderson, which were necessary to present the 
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defense theory of these defendants, but did not do so; 
nor were these requested instructions covered by those 
which were given (R 116-128). 
The manner in which this accident happened was so 
unusual and required a combination of circumstances so 
unlikely to occur that the jury might reasonably have 
found that no one was negligent or legally responsible 
for the accident and an instruction to the effect that if 
the jury should so find, they should not return a verdict 
for the plaintiff against the defendants Cox and Mc-
Kinnon would have been proper. 
By their requested instruction number 10, the de-
fendants ~1alcolm N. McKinnon and Clyde Cox requested 
the court to instruct the jury as follows: 
"You are instructed that the defendants Cox, 
McKinnon, doing business as American Fuel Com-
pany and Eastern Utah Development Company, 
had a right to assume that when said truck was 
parked for loading its brakes were in good condi-
tion and that they had been securely set, and if 
necessary, that the truck had been placed in a 
gear which would restrict its forward movement 
so as to hold said truck in place during the load-
ing operation performed by the usual and ordi-
nary method and performed with the same care 
as would be exercised by an ordinarily prudent 
person under like circumstances. Therefore, if 
you find from the evidence that said loading op-
eration was performed with ordinary care as in 
this instruction defined, said defendants would 
not be responsible for plaintiff's injuries no mat-
ter what caused the truck to roll forward from 
the place where it had been parked for loading, 
46 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and your verdict should be for said defendants, 
and each of them, no cause of action." 
As stated under Points I and II of this brief, this 
instruction included all of the issues of fact on defend-
ants' theory of defense, and the correct rule of law ap-
plicable thereto. By refusing to give it, the court failed 
to instruct the jury on defendants' theory of the case. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence is undisputed that this accident did 
not happen because of the manner in which Cox loaded 
the truck. The moving pictures established conclusively 
that if the brakes of the truck had been parked in the 
low range gear ratio with the brakes set, it would not 
have moved during the loading operation, and the jury 
in its answers to the interrogatories so found. If Clyde 
Cox was entitled to assume that the truck was properly 
parked and the brakes set, as the jury was instructed 
in 9 (a), he did not have a duty to check the truck before 
commencing to load it, nor was he under a duty to defer 
loading it, unless Anderson stayed in the cab. The "fore-
sight" rule and not the "hindsight" rule is applicable in 
this situation, as in other cases involving negligence. 
These truckers owned their trucks and were in a hurry 
to get loaded and on their way, as they were paid accord-
ing to the tonnage hauled. Was it reasonable to require 
Cox to be familiar with the brake mechanism of all the 
various trucks coming upon the premises, or to delay 
loading operations pending an examination to see that 
each truck was properly braked~ These men would re-
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sent undue interference any such conduct on the part of 
Cox on how they should operate their trucks. Could not 
Cox assume, until reasonably apprized to the contrary, 
that Anderson would take whatever precautions were 
necessary to insure the safety of the truck he was driv-
ing? 
The injuries in this case were severe. Because of 
the sympathy which a jury would naturally have for the 
plaintiff as against the American Fuel Company, a cor-
poration, it was essential that the instructions set out 
the theory of both sides fairly and adequately, which 
was not done. Because of the undue emphasis in the 
instruction on the plaintiff's theory of recovery, it would 
be an unusual jury that would not return a verdict 
against the defendants. 
We respectfully submit that the verdict in this case 
should be set aside and a judgment of No Cause of Action 
entered in favor of the defendants Malcolm N. McKinnon 
and Clyde Cox, or in the alternative that they be granted 
a new trial. 
STEW ART, CANNON & HANSON 
Attorneys for Defend.Aarnts ami/, Appel-
lants Ualcolm N. M cK ifllfl<on ood Olyde 
Cox 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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